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FROM THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TO WAZIRISTAN

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FROM
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BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE BORDER COUNTRIES AND THE MORE TURBULENT OF THE TRIBES CONTROLLED BY THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, AND OF OUR MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THEM IN THE PAST

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CHAPTER I.

THE BORDERLAND.

THE whole of the country lying immediately to the west of the Punjab, and between it and the kingdom of Afghanistan, is held by the two great nations of Pathan and Baluch, the former lying to the north and the latter to the south of a line drawn from the western face of the Suleiman Mountains opposite Dera Ghazi Khan, almost due west to Quetta. The land, then, of the Pathans may be said to comprise the regions of the Sufed Koh and the Suleiman and adjacent mountains with their numerous offshoots; and their territory may be considered roughly to be enclosed by the River Indus on the east, by Afghanistan on the west, Baluchistan on the south, and on the north by Kashmir and the Kunar River—a veritable *tangle* of brown hills.

"It is a long strip of unutterably rugged country; stony barren heights, deep abrupt valleys seamed by occasional torrents; the farms represented by a patch of corn on a hillside or a scrap of cultivation on a narrow strip of alluvial soil alongside a mountain stream. No highways, save those made by us; the village roads—mere tracks straggling over hills

and among the roughest ravines—always difficult and often dangerous. The dwelling places, fortified towers or caves among the hills." The Pathan territories occupy many thousand square miles of mountainous country through which flow the Gomal, the Kurram, the Zhob, the Kabul and other smaller rivers with their tributaries, the principal tributaries of the Kabul River being the Chitral, the Bara, the Swat and the Kalpani. The rainfall in this region is scanty and uncertain, and agriculture can only properly be carried on in those tracts watered by these rivers.

The language of the Pathan is called Pushtu or Pukhtu, according as it is the softer Kandahari dialect or the hard guttural speech of the Peshawar Valley, the line which separates the two being the northern boundary of the Khattak tract in Kohat and the south-east corner of the Peshawar District. It is only since the fourteenth century that Pushtu has attained the dignity of a written language. And what of the men who speak it? What is a Pathan?

In India all Pushtu-speaking people come under this designation—a corruption of the word "Pukhtun"—the term being frequently used to denote equally the Pathan proper, the Afghan, the Tajik, the Hazara and the Ghilzai; but, strictly speaking, the title is not really applicable to any of the four last, who, though related to the true Pathan by historical, geographical and ethnological association, are none the less distinct peoples. There is great conflict of opinion as to the original stock from which the Pathans have sprung—

the traditions of the people themselves are conflicting, vague and misleading, but the Pathans believe that they are descended from Saul, the first King of the Jews. They speak of themselves as "Beni Israel," the children of Israel, and the greybeards of the Pathan tribes are fond of tracing their story back to Ibrahim, Isak and Yakub. However far-fetched and mainly traditionary the connection may be, there is, as discussed by Bellew, a savour of Israelitish custom and an often remarkable similarity of name still surviving—Amazites, Moabites and Hittites live again in Amazai, Muhibwal and Hotiwal, to be found on Mount Morah, the hill Pehor, and the plain of Galilee (Jalala); there is the valley of Sudum; the observance of the "Passover," offering sin and thank offerings, or driving off the scapegoat laden with the sins of the people—with many other religious and social observances which are Jewish rather than Islamic in their origin. It would seem that the Pathan race is closely allied to the Afghan on the one side, and, though perhaps not so closely, to certain tribes of Aryan Indians on the other. (The language is a mixture of partly Persian, partly Indian—Prakrit —origin.) The Pathan may be indeed described as an Indian Afghan, and the probabilities are that he represents an earlier eastern emigration of certain sections of the same tribes as have given birth to the Afghan; and from this point of view the Pathan and the Afghan are by origin one and the same. Whatever view is correct, there can be no doubt that the Pathan differs from the Afghan in the possession of

certain Indian affinities not present in the other. Whether these are due to an admixture of Indian blood, or whether they are merely the result of close and prolonged political and social contact with India, is a matter of no very particular importance.

Ibbetson favours the theory that the Pathans are in the main a race of Indian extraction, that is, that the Pathan stock is decidedly Indian despite the admixture of foreign blood. According to him, the true Pathans are the modern representatives of an Aryan Indian race called by Herodotus the Pactiyae, which gave birth to many of the tribes represented to-day in and on the borders of the Peshawar Valley. According to this view the Pathans proper are those Pathan tribes which have a decidedly Pactiyan stock, in which the preponderating racial element is Indian; while the mixed Pactiyan and foreign tribes in which the stock is not Indian, but Afghan, Turk or Scythian, as the case may be, are Pathan by virtue of their Pactiyan blood, as well as by their geographical location, association, customs and language. But that the stock is in the main Afghan rather than Indian, seems borne out by the fact that from the earliest times of which historical records exist, we find the Pathan ever arrayed against and despising the Indian —evincing an antagonism which is not merely practical and political, but one of ideals and sentiment. On the other hand, although the Pathan tribes have had constant and bloody feuds with the Afghans, in their brief periods of peace they display a marked similarity of sentiment, ideals and aims, while the

mental characteristics of the Pathan also approximate much more closely to the Afghan than to those of any purely Indian tribe.

Of the other races and tribes to which the term Pathan is loosely applied, the *Ghilzais* are a race of mixed Turkish and Persian descent, which has now become assimilated with the Afghans by sentiment and association. The *Tajiks*, another to which the term Pathan is applied, are of pure Persian origin, and are believed to be the remnants of certain Persian tribes who once inhabited Afghanistan before the advent of the Afghans by whom they were subdued. The Tajiks still retain their Persian speech. The *Hazaras* are Persian-speaking Tartars who have long settled among the Afghans, but who hold among them a subordinate and dependent position.

The character of the Pathan is a favourite theme of disparagement amongst the frontier officials of the last half-century and more. In 1855, Mr. Temple, then Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, wrote thus of them: "Now these tribes are savages—noble savages perhaps—and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. . . . They have nominally a religion, but Muhammadanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest race on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels. . . . They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their

influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain. . . . They are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother offers prayers that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never even occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding, if against their own interests. . . . They are fierce and bloodthirsty . . . they are perpetually at war with each other. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood-feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. . . . They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. . . . To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer he may be robbed and killed."

Mr. Ibbetson wrote of the Pathan in 1881: "The true Pathan is perhaps the most barbaric of all the races with which we are brought into contact in the Punjab. . . . He is bloodthirsty, cruel and vindic-

tive in the highest degree; he does not know what truth or faith is, insomuch that the saying *Afghan be iman* (*i.e.* an Afghan is without conscience) has passed into a proverb among his neighbours; and though he is not without courage of a sort, and is often curiously reckless of his life, he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from behind, or to meet him on equal terms if it were possible to take advantage of him, however meanly. It is easy to convict him out of his own mouth; here are some of his proverbs: 'a Pathan's enmity smoulders like a dung fire'; 'a cousin's tooth breaks upon a cousin';[1] 'keep a cousin poor but use him'; 'when he is little play with him; when he is grown up he is a cousin, fight him'; 'speak good words to an enemy very softly; gradually destroy him root and branch.' At the same time he has a code of honour which he strictly observes, and which he quotes with pride under the name of *Pukhtunwali*. It imposes on him three chief obligations—*Nanawatai*, or the right of asylum, which compels him to shelter and protect even an enemy who comes as a suppliant; *Badal*, or the necessity for revenge by retaliation; and *Mailmastai*, or openhanded hospitality to all who may demand it. And of these three perhaps the last is the greatest. And there is a charm about him, especially about the leading men, which almost makes one forget his treacherous nature. As the proverb says—'the Pathan is one moment a saint, and the next a devil.'

[1] It is significant that the Pushtu word *tarbur* means both cousin and enemy.

For centuries he has been, on our frontier at least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastnesses of his mountains; and there is an air of masculine independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the most fanatical type, exceedingly proud and extraordinarily superstitious." Holdich says of the Pathan that "he will shoot his own relations just as soon as the relations of his enemy—possibly sooner—and he will shoot them from behind. Yet the individual Pathan may be trusted to be true to his salt and to his engagements."

Of one Pathan tribe Macgregor said that "there is no doubt, like other Pathans, they would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to gain an end. Money could buy their services for the foulest deed; cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark their actions to a wounded or helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp them against determined resistance." While Mr. Elsmie has spoken as follows of his five years' experience as a Commissioner and Judge among the Pathans of the Peshawar border: "Crime of the worst conceivable kind is a matter of almost daily occurrence; murder in all its phases, unblushing assassination in broad daylight before a crowd of witnesses; the carefully planned secret murder of the sleeping victim at dead of night, murder by robbers, by rioters, by poisoners, by boys, and by women sword in hand. Blood always crying for blood, revenge looked upon as a virtue, the heritage of retribution passed on as a solemn duty from

father to son. It would seem that the spirit of murder is latent in the heart of nearly every man in the valley." But, on the other hand, Oliver tells us in *Across the Border*, that the Pathan has sometimes been condemned in what appear too sweeping terms, and that "there is a sort of charm about the better sort that inclines many people to forget his treacherous nature, and even his 'vice is sometimes by action dignified.'"

Probably what Lieut. Enriquez says about these tribesmen in his *Pathan Borderland* describes them with, on the whole, more justice, if less vehemence, than have some of those other writers from whom quotations have here been made. "The Pathan," he says, "is not so black as he is painted. It should not be overlooked that most of the tribes have only been established three hundred years in their present territories, and that their habits are not really much worse than were those of the various English tribes during the first few centuries after their final settlement. The conditions of a feudal system, under which each baron lived in his own castle, and waged constant war with his neighbours over disputes relating to land and women, are simply being repeated again across our border. For stories of gross treachery, or cold-blooded murder and inter-family strife, we have only to turn back the pages of our own history book. In fact, it seems quite unfair to judge the Pathan according to twentieth century standards. For him it is still the tenth century. Moreover, it is ungenerous to assert that there are not many noble

exceptions amongst them. . . . When you meet a Pathan, you meet a man like yourself. . . . He will never allow you to abuse him, but makes up for it amply by never making you wish to do so. There is perhaps no native of India who is less irritating to our nerves, and his ideas of tact seem to run on quite the same lines as our own. . . . He takes his independence for granted, and very seldom parades it in the garb of rudeness."

Take him for all in all, there is in the Pathan much to like, a good deal to respect and much to detest. He is very susceptible to the personal influence of Englishmen who are strong, resolute and fearless—men of the type of Nicholson, Abbott, Cavagnari, Battye and many others. In our service he has usually been a loyal and devoted sepoy, and no better instance of the loyalty of the Pathan soldier can be given than is furnished by that of the small body of Khyber Rifles in 1897, who, as Holdich has told us, "maintained British honour in the Khyber, while 9,500 British troops about the Peshawar frontier looked on."

The Pathan enlists freely into our service—there are at the present moment something like eleven thousand Pathans in the Indian Army, and probably the recruiting among the tribesmen was never brisker than during the few months immediately following the close of the operations in Tirah of 1897-98—and he will march anywhere and fight anyone against whom he may be led. Over and over again have Pathans fought in our ranks against

their fellow-tribesmen and their own homes. Not only against fathers and brothers, but even against the still more potent religious appeals from the local Ghazis. One thing, however, the Pathan recruit does not give up, "but brings with him to his regiment, keeps through his service, must have leave to look after, will resign promotion to gratify, and looks forward to retiring to thoroughly enjoy—and that is—his cherished feud." If he has not got one when he joins, he may inherit one which may become just as binding, though it concerns people he has not seen for years, and hardly knew when he left home. In India the white man wants leave to get married, he is sick, he needs a change, or to avoid a bad station—for the Pathan soldier there is only one class of "urgent private affairs," but for this he must have leave. Everyone knows for what purpose he goes; it is the only reason when the refusal of leave would justify desertion. In many of the Punjab regiments which recruit Pathans there are cases of trans-frontier soldiers who will serve together in all amity for years, but between whom is so bitter a feud that they must take their furlough at different times, since, if they went together, not all would come back.

As to the personal appearance of "the raw material," here is a picture drawn from life by Oliver: "The style of the Tribesman is a little after the manner of Rob Roy—'my foot is on my native heath,' and 'am I not a Pathan'? Even when he leaves his native heath behind, he takes his manners with him. He will come down, a stalwart, manly-looking ruffian,

with frank and open manners, rather Jewish features, long hair plentifully oiled under a high turban, with a loose tunic, blue for choice—the better to hide the dirt—worn very long, baggy drawers, a *lungi* or sash across his shoulders, grass sandals, a sheep-skin coat with the hair inside, thickly populated, a long heavy knife, and a rifle, if he is allowed to carry either. He is certain to be filthy and he may be ragged, but he will saunter into a Viceregal *durbar* as proud as Lucifer, and with an air of unconcern a diplomatist might envy."

The Pathan tribes are partly agriculturists and partly nomads, but their migrations are on a small and restricted scale, being no more than annual moves within their own limits from one grazing ground to another, or from their homes among the hills to the warmer and lower valleys. Beyond and upon our frontier the Pathans live in fortified villages, to which are attached stone towers in commanding positions serving as watch towers and places of refuge for the inhabitants. A large number of the men of each tribe obtain their livelihood as petty merchants or traders, carrying goods in caravans between India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. These wandering traders are called *Powindahs*, a term derived from the Persian word *Parwindah*, which signifies a bale of goods. The villages are divided into several distinct allotments of sub-divisions called *Kandis*, according to the number of the sub-divisions of the tribe residing in it. Thus in each village each group of families which goes to form a *Khel*, or clan, has its own Kandi, at the head

of which is a *Malik*, who acts as its judge, manager or administrator. In each Kandi, again, there is a *Jumaat*, or mosque, under a *Mullah*, or priest, and an assembly room, called *hujra*, where the residents meet to discuss their affairs, and where visitors and travellers are sheltered. At the head of each clan is a chief styled *Khan*, to whom the *Maliks* are subordinate, but the tribesmen being intensely independent and impatient of control, it is not surprising that neither Maliks nor Khans enjoy any real power. They may be said indeed to possess influence rather than power. All matters of general tribal interest are settled by the decision of a *jirgah* or council of Maliks and in this the real controlling authority resides, the Khan, or tribal chief, merely acting as president of the tribal jirgah, as their leader in time of war, and during peace as their accredited agent for inter-tribal communication. But among the Pathans there can be very little like ordered government, and as a matter of fact the several clans decide their disputes independently of any central controlling authority. The office of Malik and Khan is usually hereditary, but by no means always.

It is not very uncommon for families of one tribe or clan to quarrel with their brethren, and leaving their own tribe, to claim the protection of a neighbouring one. They then become *hamsayas*, or "dwellers beneath the shade," and secure protection in return for obedience. With the Pathans the action of this custom is chiefly confined to traders, menials and other dependents of foreign extraction, who are protected by, but not received into, the tribe.

The great majority of the Pathan tribes are Sunni[1] Muhammadans of a bigoted sort, the exception being the Turis and some of the Bangash and Orakzai clansmen, who are Shiahs. Of the different dignitaries of the Pathan Church there is no occasion here to speak further than to remark that the Mullah, to whom allusion has already been made, is the ordinary, hard working parish priest, whose duties are to attend to the services of the Church, teach the creed, and look after the schools. He is the most important factor in Pathan life and his influence is enormous, despite the fact, as Dr. Pennell points out, "that there is no priesthood in Islam," and that according to its tenets, there is no act of worship and no religious rite which may not, in the absence of a Mullah, be equally well performed by any pious layman. Since, however, "knowledge has been almost limited to the priestly class, it is only natural that in a village, where the Mullahs are almost the only men who can lay claim to anything more than the most rudimentary learning, they should have the people of the village entirely in their own control." The general security in which the Mullah lives is the best possible evidence of the deference accorded to his office. "He is almost the only man," says Oliver, "whose life is sacred from the casual bullet or the hasty knife, for whose blood the Pathan tariff does not provide a rate."

[1] The Sunnis represent the orthodox church of Islam, recognise no divine right of succession to the Caliphate, and claim for the "faithful" free choice in the selection of their spiritual leader; the Shiahs, or sectarians, claim that the right of succession to Muhammad rests with his cousin Ali and Ali's descendants.

His flock is generally ignorant of everything connected with the Muhammadan religion beyond its most elementary doctrines. In matters of faith the Pathans confine themselves to the belief that there is a God, a prophet, a resurrection, and a day of judgment. They know there is a Koran, but are probably wholly ignorant of its contents. Their practice is un-Islamic. Though they repeat every day that there is one God only who is worthy of worship, they almost invariably prefer to worship some saint or tomb. Indeed, superstition is a more appropriate term for the ordinary belief of the people than the name of religion.

Since mention has above been made of the religious divisions of the tribesmen, I may perhaps briefly allude to their political factions, since reports from beyond the border make frequent mention of the feuds of Gar and Samil. In the fourteenth century a chief of the Bangash tribe, Ismail by name, had two sons, Gar and Samil, whose quarrels led to the tribe being split up into the two great factions which still exist under these names. Bangash or Bankash means "root-destroyer," and this was adopted or bestowed as the tribal name by reason of the enmity aroused between the rival factions. The distinction then established still remains, and affects almost all the surrounding tribes; and since some Sunnis by religion are Samil in politics, and some Shiahs are Gar, while sometimes both cases are reversed, it may easily be realised how prolific are the causes for private quarrels and tribal feuds beyond the Bloody Border.

Of so turbulent a race what Temple said about them

in 1855 might with almost equal truth have been repeated of them annually up to the present time: "They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our subjects in the plains and valleys near the frontier; they have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and isolated murders without number; they have often levied blackmail from our villages; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve and its inhabitants as their game. When inclined for cruel sport they sally forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our own troops, and even killed our officers in our own territories. They have given an asylum to every malcontent or proclaimed criminal who can escape from British justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our villages, trade in our markets; but few British subjects, and no servant of the British Government, would dare to enter their country on any account whatever."

Since the 400 miles of our borderland, comprised in the stretch from Buner on the right to Waziristan on the left, is, as computed by the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1897, inhabited by 200,000 first-rate fighting men, of the quarrelsome character above described—every man at all times ready and eager for blood-letting—it would be as well now to recount

the measures which the Government of India adopts for their restraint; to state the composition and general distribution of the instruments by means of which the peace of the frontier is more or less preserved; and to note the manner in which offences committed by independent tribes beyond the border are punished.

For the defence of the border, and to prevent the incursion of armed robbers, the system generally followed—with some recent modifications—has been the maintenance of a line of fortified posts along the frontier, garrisoned by regulars and militia. In the year 1884 there were fifty-four such posts situated in the Hazara, Yusafzai, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur districts, and of these sixteen were held by the Punjab Frontier Force, twenty-six by militia, and the remainder by combined parties of both militia and regulars. In those days the Punjab Frontier Force was generally responsible—a responsibility which endured until 1903—for the military defence of the frontier, with the exception of the Peshawar district. The force was approximately 15,000 strong, and consisted of four regiments of cavalry, the Guides (cavalry and infantry), four mountain batteries, one garrison battery, and eleven infantry battalions, the whole commanded by a Brigadier-General. At that time it was immediately under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, but it was a few years later placed under the Commander-in-Chief in India. With the gradual extension of the frontier, and the general

forward movement made within recent years, it became apparent that the Punjab Frontier Force could no longer remain a local and also a border force, and that in any comprehensive scheme of frontier defence other regiments of the Indian army must take their share. In 1903, then, the Punjab Frontier Force was abolished.

Under Lord Curzon's rule in India a change was inaugurated in the system of frontier defence. Regular troops have been gradually withdrawn, as far as possible, from advanced trans-frontier positions, and have been concentrated in large centres within easy reach. Their places on the border have been taken by various corps of militia, military police, and levies raised locally; communications have been improved; strategic railways have crept further forward; another bridge has been thrown across the Indus; and the frontier is now defended by the Peshawar and Quetta divisions and the Kohat, Derajat and Bannu brigades, moveable columns being held always ready to move out at a moment's notice from Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The general sphere of action prescribed for each of these columns is as under:

Peshawar Column, - -	The Khyber and the Malakand.
Kohat Column, - - -	The Kurram.
Bannu Column, - -	The Tochi.
Dera Ismail Khan Column,	Waziristan.

It remains to note the manner in which offences committed by independent tribes across the border are punished. The most simple way of dealing with

a refractory tribe, and in many cases the most effectual, is to inflict a fine and demand compensation for plundered property or for lives lost. When the tribe is dependent upon trade with British territory, or when a portion resides within British limits, or is easily accessible from the plains to an attack by a military force, the demand for payment of fine or compensation is generally acceded to, and, being paid, the tribe is again received into favour. Should the demand be refused, hostages are demanded, or members of the tribe and their property found within British territory are seized, until such time as the compensation and fine are paid. Against some tribes, as in the case of the Afridis of the Kohat Pass in 1876-77, a blockade is an effective measure of punishment. It can, however, only be employed against such tribes as trade with British territory, and, while it lasts, any member of the offending tribe found within our border is at once seized and detained. This means of punishment has often been found effectual, and if effectual, it is preferable to a military expedition, which often leaves behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss of life. Last as a measure of punishment comes the military expedition, which is only resorted to in exceptional circumstances, and when every other means of coercing a hostile tribe has failed.

The necessity, in certain circumstances, for military expeditions has been admitted by the civil authorities of the Punjab in the following statement made in 1864 by Mr. Davies, Secretary to the Punjab

Government: "The despatch of an expedition into the hills is always in the nature of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international offences. It is, as a rule, not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate arbitration of any contested claim of its own, that the British Government resolves on such measures, but simply as the only means by which retribution can be obtained for acknowledged crimes by its neighbours, and by which justice can be satisfied or future outrages prevented. In the extreme cases in which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penalties for civil crime—evils in themselves inevitable from deficiencies of preventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects. Considerations of expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of incurring antagonism and combination against us on the part of the tribes, all weigh heavily against expeditions; and to set them aside, there must be irresistible obligation to protect and to vindicate the outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from the revenge and retaliation they formerly practised."

At the present moment rather over 9000 Pathans are serving in our militias, border military police and levies, while considerably more than 10,000 are in the ranks of the regular regiments of the Indian army; a certain number, too, are serving in the forces maintained by native chiefs. Considering the readiness with which the Pathan accepts military service, it cannot be said that these numbers are

high, but the fact would seem to be that while some tribes are supplying us with more recruits than they can well afford, others have scarcely been drawn upon at all, and many races along the Pathan borderland remain still altogether unexploited.

[1]The North-West Frontier Province is, with the exception of Behar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa, the youngest of the provinces into which British India is divided, while in respect of population and extent of territory administered according to British law, it is also the smallest. It lies between the 31st and 36th degrees of latitude and the 69th and 74th degrees of longitude; its total length, as the crow flies, is over 400 miles, its average breadth is from 100 to 150 miles, the total area comprised within its limits being roughly 38,000 square miles. Only 13,000 square miles, however, are under full British law and administration, and 25,000 square miles are occupied by tribes who are under British political control, but who maintain their internal or municipal independence. The British territory part of the province is divided into the five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, whose western boundary, known as the administrative border, is a sinuous line extending for some 600 miles. On the other side of this administrative or inner provincial border dwell the municipally independent tribes who

[1]For what follows I am indebted to a paper read by Mr. W. R. H. Merk, C.S.I., LL.D., at the Royal Society of Arts, and published in the Journal for June, 1911, on "the North-West Frontier Province of India." The North-West Frontier Province was formed on the 9th November, 1901.

are under the political control of the Chief Commissioner, a control which he exercises with the aid of the officers in charge of the political agencies, viz. Swat, Dir and Chitral, the Khyber, the Kurram, and Northern and Southern Waziristan. These agencies have been described as the tentacles of civilised order, stretching into a mass of barbarism and savagery; and the remainder of the space beyond the administrative border and as far as the "Durand line" or "the outer provincial border," separating the British and Afghan spheres of influence, is occupied by the independent tribes. The length of this outer border cannot be less than 800 miles.

The population of the five British districts is about 2,200,000, and of the outer portion of the province probably a million and a half.

After the border war of 1897 a narrow gauge line was laid from Nowshera, on the Kabul River, to the foot of the Malakand; constructed in the first instance for military reasons, it rapidly developed into an important artery of commerce, justifying its conversion from a narrow to a broad gauge. Another railway which, in 1897, stopped on the left bank of the Indus at Kushalgarh, now crosses the Indus by a bridge, and has been extended via Kohat and Hangu to Thal, at the southern end of the Kurram Valley. A third line to the base of the hills is under construction; it will be taken over the Indus at Kalabagh and carried to Bannu. When the Thal railway has been extended to the head of the Kurram Valley; when a short line has been constructed in the

Hazara district; and when a lateral branch has been provided from Bannu to Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, the province will be fairly well equipped with railways of a distinct commercial and strategic value.

A perusal of the chapters which follow will probably make it apparent that the general policy of the Government of India in regard to the frontier tribes is, and has been—as well described by a former Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province—"a forward one only when necessity compels, and stationary where circumstances permit."

then, with the help of other tribes, drove the Dilazaks across the Indus into Hazara. The Yusafzais, with the Utman Khel and Tarkanris, now settled themselves in the Yusafzai plain, and during the next few years these three tribes made themselves masters of all the hill country along that border, from the Indus to the range separating the Bajaur and Kunar Valleys. In a later division of the country the Tarkanris took Bajaur; the Utman Khel the Swat Valley up to the junction of that river with the Panjkhora; while the Yusafzais occupied all the hills to the east as far as the Indus, including Lower Swat, Buner, Chamla and the Peshawar Valley east of Hastnagar and north of the Kabul River. At the present time the Yusafzais inhabit the north-east of the Peshawar district, or the Yusafzai plain, Swat, Buner, Panjkhora, and several strips of independent territory north and east of the Peshawar Valley. They have also considerable settlements to the east of the Indus as we have seen.

At the time of the final division of the country with the Tarkanris and the Utman Khels, the Yusafzais were divided into two great branches, the Mandanr and the Yusafzais, the whole race tracing its origin to Mandai, who had two sons, Yusaf and Umar. From Yusaf sprang the Yusafzais, and from a son of Umar called Mandan, the Mandanr took their name. On the occupation of this tract of country, an equal division of both plain and hill country was made between the Mandanr and the Yusafzais, but quarrels arising, the Yusafzais gradually became owners of the hill country, while the Mandanr were driven

CHAPTER VII.

THE CLANS OF BAJAUR AND DIR.[1]

THE inhabitants of both these countries are mainly Yusafzais—Tarkanri or Tarklanri Yusafzais in Bajaur, and Akozai Yusafzais in Dir.

Bajaur is bounded on the north by Dir, and on the east by Dir and Swat, on the south-east and south by the Utman Khel country, on the south again for a short distance by the Mohmands, and on the west by Afghanistan. It is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the Rud River, and including within its area the valleys of the Rud, of Babukarra, Watelai and Chaharmung.

The Bajauris or Tarkanris are Sarbani Pathans of the Khakhai Khel branch and representatives of the ancient Gandhari, with whom they returned from Kabul in the fifteenth century to the Peshawar Valley, and a hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the Gujars, then in occupation of Bajaur. "In 1504," we are reminded by Oliver, "the Emperor Baber acquired the sovereignty of Kabul and Ghazni, and in the following year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, going

[1] See Maps IV. and V.

along the whole border, and returning by the Sakhi Sarwar Pass and the Bori Valley to Ghazni. At this period the Pathan settlers are described as pretty well established in Laghman, Peshawar, Swat and Bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled for independence under their hereditary chiefs. During the next twenty-five years the Mogul Baber undertook many forays—for most of them could not be called anything else—to punish the hill Pathans, or to protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold their own. Guided by the Dilazaks, he marched against Bajaur, carried the fortress of the original Sultan by escalade, using the new matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to extend the power of the Tarklanris."

The Tarkanris have three main divisions:

1. Ismailzai.
2. Isozai.
3. Mamunds,

and of the different valleys into which Bajaur is split up, the Maidan Valley is occupied by the Ismailzai, the Baraul and Jandol Valleys by the Isozai, and the valleys of Babukarra, Chaharmung and Watelai by the Mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in Afghanistan. Some six or seven alien tribes also live among the Bajauris—chiefly in the Jandol and Maidan Valleys. Originally Jandol belonged to Bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the political control of Dir, whose ruler,

however, has little or no authority over the people of the Jandol Valley.

The Maidan Valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well cultivated, watered by the Maidan or Kunai River. The Jandol Valley, whose northern and southern boundaries are the Janbatai Range and the Rud River, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and is also rich and well cultivated. The Baraul Valley is divided into an upper and a lower, the upper including the Janbatai district, and good crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. The Babukarra Valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of five or six miles; the range of the Hindu Raj divides it from Asmar on the north, on the east the Takwara spur separates it from Jandol, on the west is the Mamund or Watelai Valley, while to the south, on the right bank of the Bajaur River, is the country of the Utman Khel. The Chaharmung Valley lies between the Mamund country on the north-east and the Kamangara Valley on the south-west. The Watelai Valley, occupied by the Mamunds, the most important section of the Tarkanris or Bajauris, lies between the valleys of Chaharmung and Babukarra; it is about thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. The Mamunds are probably the most warlike of the Tarkanris, and can put

12,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.

The position of the Khan of Nawagai requires some explanation. He is the hereditary chief of a branch of the Salarzai sub-division of the Mamunds, and also of all the Tarkanris, but his authority has of late years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without influence, even far beyond the borders of his own Khanate. His actual territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the Rud River, together with the district of Surkamar; part of his country was encroached upon some years ago by the Mohmands, and he has never been sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.

The country known as Dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the Panjkora River and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the Rud River of Bajaur. The Upper Panjkora Valley is known as the Panjkora Kohistan, and is divided into two parts called Bashkar and Sheringal. The principal subsidiary valleys of Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the Baraul and the Maidan on the west, and the Ushiri and Talash Valleys on the east. The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range which divides it from Chitral and Yasin; the Durand line is the boundary on the west; on the east it is bounded by Kohistan, and on the south by the valley of Upper Swat and by Bajaur. From the mass of mountains to the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. The easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the Swat and the Indus

Rivers, runs first due south and then west to the Malakand. The central forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Swat. The westernmost range is a continuation of the Hindu Raj, runs south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the Panjkora and Rud Rivers on the one side and the Kunar on the other. The most important pass which crosses it is the Lowari or Laorai (10,250 feet), open for convoys from April to November; it carries the main road from India to Chitral.

The four sections of the Malizai sub-division of the Khwazozai-Akozais resident in Dir are:

1. Painda Khel.
2. Sultan Khel.
3. Nusrudin Khel.
4. Ausa Khel.

On the Panjkora River, commencing from the north, in the Kashkar Valley, in which the village of Dir is situated, is the Akhund Khel sub-section of the Painda Khel Malizais, to which the Khan of Dir belongs. Below these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the Painda Khel, and on the right bank the Sultan Khel; and, still further down, the Sultan Khel, Nusrudin Khel and Ausa Khel on both banks of the river.

The route to Chitral from the Swat Valley leads through this country. Leaving the Swat River at Chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west and enters the Uch Valley, passing by the Katgola Pass (3000 feet) into the Talash Valley, where, as Bellew tells us and as later travellers have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from

At this period, in view of the possibility of trouble in the Buner and Mohmand countries, the Reserve Brigade was moved up to Mardan from Rawal Pindi, and a second reserve brigade was mobilised, but the units composing it were not required to leave their garrisons; they were No. 1 Mountain Battery R.A., 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 28th Punjab Infantry, and 39th Garhwal Rifles.

The Panjkora River had been rising every day, and by the 11th April had become quite unfordable, and, while bridging materials were being collected, the Second Brigade was closed up to Sado and Khungai, the Third being distributed between Gumbat and Chakdara. By the night of the 12th the bridge was ready for foot traffic, the river showed no signs of further rising, and six companies of the Guides crossed to the right bank, where they formed an entrenched position to serve as a bridge-head, commanded at short range from the high ground of the left bank. Here the Guides were conveniently placed to carry out the orders they were to execute on the following morning, viz. to march down the right bank of the river and destroy certain villages whence the convoys had been persistently annoyed. It had been intended to support the Guides by passing over other troops, and another company of the Guides was later able to cross; but during the night of the 12th-13th the river suddenly rose, bringing down large masses of timber and practically breaking up the newly-completed bridge.

At 6 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye took five

companies up the Rud River, leaving two companies to hold the bridge-head, and marched up the left bank to Subhan Killa, whence parties were detached to the east to burn three villages. Re-concentrating then at Subhan Killa, the Rud or Jandol River was crossed and the heights on the right bank of the Panjkora were ascended, from whence other villages were destroyed. About noon large parties of the enemy appeared to be advancing, and on Colonel Battye signalling this information to Headquarters at Sado, he was directed to fall back on the bridge-head, where the high bank was lined by troops of the Second Brigade to cover the retirement. As usual on the frontier, the retirement had no sooner commenced than it was hotly pressed, and it was perhaps not begun quite so soon as it might have been, or as was under the circumstances advisable, owing to the fact that it was impossible for the commander with the main body of the Guides infantry to be certain whether the detached parties had, or had not, complied with the order to fall back. The conduct of the retirement, made practically under the eyes of the whole of the Second Brigade, was, as recorded by General Low and as endorsed by all who saw it, "a splendid performance." Very deliberately the different companies retired, fiercely assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of command, and relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position only to take up another a few yards back. Twice did the Guides fix bayonets to meet the onrush, expected but never actually made. Shortly before recrossing the Jandol

River near its junction with the Panjkora, Colonel Battye fell mortally wounded, the command devolving on Captain Campbell.

The bridge-head was reached just before dark, and the enemy kept up a fire till nearly 11 a.m. The Guides were reinforced by two Maxims and a company of the 4th Sikhs sent across the river on rafts, while support was also afforded by five companies of infantry on the left bank and a mountain battery, whose firing of star shell probably prevented any attempt to rush the post. By early morning of the 14th the tribal gathering—chiefly Utman Khels and men from Mundah—had dispersed, having experienced very heavy losses. On this day the Third Brigade moved up to Sado, and six more companies of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on rafts to the Guides entrenchment; but the continued rapid rise of the river made bridge construction at this spot impossible, and eventually a suspension bridge was thrown across a gorge two miles lower down the river, being completed by the evening of the 16th.

On this date the rain, which had been falling heavily for some days, ceased, and the river began to subside. The Third Brigade was now ordered to lead, and crossed to the right bank on the 17th, the Second Brigade moving over next day. General Gatacre advanced up the Jandol Valley, experiencing some opposition about Manugai, and finally bivouacked at Ghobani, where early next morning the Second Brigade joined him. An hour later the combined force advanced on Mundah and Miankilai, which were

found deserted, and the cavalry pushed a reconnaissance to the foot of the Janbatai Pass, finding the people generally friendly.

From here it was decided to despatch a small flying column to Chitral, and a mountain battery, with two infantry battalions and half a company of Sappers from the Third Brigade, marched on that afternoon to Barwa and on the 19th to the Janbatai Pass.

Bandai was reached by General Gatacre's advance column on the 20th, and here he received news that the Chitral garrison was in great straits, and therefore he proposed to General Low that he should be permitted to push on with 500 men; this suggestion was approved, and, pressing forward, General Gatacre was in Dir on the 22nd.

In the meantime the situation had undergone some change. Umra Khan had fled to the Asmar border, and thence to Kabul, leaving the resettlement of his territory to the British; the left flank of our line of advance was in a measure menaced by the presence of the Utman Khel, Nawagai and Mamund tribesmen; while intelligence, received on the 21st, that the siege of Chitral had been abandoned, obviated the need for any forced march to its relief such as had been arranged.

From Dir to Ashreth in Chitral territory via the Lowari Pass was twenty-three miles, and the whole of General Gatacre's column, in spite of the extraordinary difficulties of the road, was concentrated at Ashreth by the 30th April, and was ordered to halt there for the present. On the 10th May the 1st Bat-

talion the Buffs, the Derajat Mountain Battery, and the 4th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners were led by General Gatacre to Chitral, where the Gilgit Column had arrived on the 20th April, and with this the object of the expedition may be said to have been accomplished; Umra Khan, who had actually originated all the trouble, had fled the country, while on the 27th April Sher Afzul, the late claimant to the Mehtarship of Chitral, had been brought into our camp at Dir, having been captured in Bashkar by some of the Khan of Dir's levies.

On the 10th May the troops hitherto serving on the lines of communication were formed into a Fourth Brigade of the Chitral Relief Force, under Brigadier-General Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., and it was not until the middle of August that some of the troops—mostly of the Fourth Brigade—commenced their return march to India. On the 4th September the Third Brigade ceased to exist; on the 28th General Low's Headquarters demobilised at Nowshera; and about the same date Brigadier-General Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade and of all troops remaining beyond the frontier.

On the final withdrawal of the force it was found that while regular troops must continue to be maintained on the Malakand Pass, at Chakdara, and in Chitral territory, it would be possible to keep open the Nowshera-Chitral road by peaceful means, its security from the Swat River to the borders of Chitral territory being maintained by levies, and the route adopted being via Panjkora and Dir.

During this expedition the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low had sustained a loss in action of twenty-one killed and 101 wounded; but in addition, and in consequence of fanatical attacks, further casualties were experienced, altogether two soldiers and forty-nine followers having been killed, and three soldiers and forty-seven followers wounded, between the middle of April and the date of the final withdrawal of the force.

After our troops had returned to India the condition of affairs in Bajaur and Dir was generally satisfactory, and the arrangements for the maintenance of the road promised to work well. There was a certain amount of local unrest, as was only perhaps to be expected; but both in 1896 and 1897 the Chitral reliefs marched by the Malakand-Chitral road without experiencing any interference whatever on the part of the tribesmen. At various times both the Khan of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai attempted to extend their influence by force of arms, the one in Jandol, the other in the Babukarra Valley, but both showed themselves ready to yield to the pacificatory influence of the political agent for Dir and Swat. There were rumours also that Umra Khan contemplated revisiting this part of the frontier, but he ultimately decided to return to Kabul.

The whole country had been so recently pacified that it was hardly to be hoped that it would remain quiescent during the disturbances of the year 1897. The Mullahs, always opposed to the establishment of any civilising influence tending to weaken or destroy

their supremacy over their peoples, had been busy preaching against the British, and it was known that they were doing their utmost to form a hostile combination of the clans against us; while other outside influences, which need not here be particularly specified, were also known to be in action. The Khans of Dir and Nawagai behaved very well under difficult circumstances, and seem to have done their best to check and stifle sedition, but proved in the end unable altogether to restrain the fanaticism of their followers. When the "Mad Mullah" actually arrived in Swat from Buner in July, 1897, the Khan of Dir was away in Kohistan, but even had he been present it seems improbable that he would have had sufficient influence or power to stem the outbreak, culminating in the attacks upon the Malakand and Chakdara positions described in Chapter V. But on his return to Swat, and when the tide had turned in our favour, both he and the Khan of Nawagai did what in them lay to assist the British Government, by reopening communications and by holding the important river crossings on the Chitral road.

Operations of the Malakand Field Force in Dir and Bajaur in 1897.—The attacks on the Malakand and on the Chakdara post, with the composition and early operations of the Malakand Field Force, under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, have already been described in Chapter V. These operations commenced with the subjection and punishment of the people of Lower and Upper Swat. It had been proposed to deal next with the Utman Khels, but more

important events then transpiring, obliged the postponement of the coercion of this tribe; and the news that the forces of the Hadda Mullah, signally defeated on the 9th August by the troops from Peshawar, were advancing into Dir, caused the recall of General Blood's Second Brigade from Utman Khel territory, and the move of his Third Brigade to Uch in the Adinzai Valley. The Mullah's gathering now dispersed, and General Blood was directed to co-operate with General Elles in the punishment of the Mohmands, by moving with two brigades through Bajaur via Sado and Nawagai. At Nawagai our troops would be in rear of the Mohmands, who had never before been attacked from the north, and from this place a caravan route leads due south to the Peshawar border, passing Lokerai in the Bohai Valley, where are many Mohmand villages.

On the 4th and 5th September General Wodehouse moved his brigade—now somewhat reconstructed—hurriedly from Uch to Sado, and was only just in time to prevent the seizure of the Panjkora Bridge by the Bajauris and Utman Khels, who had now made up their minds to oppose us. The First Brigade (Meiklejohn) was now left to hold the Swat Valley and our communications up to Sado; the Second (Jeffreys) marched from Chakdara, via Sarai, the Panjkora and Kotkai to Ghosam, where it arrived on the 9th; while by the 11th the Third Brigade (Wodehouse) was concentrated at Shakrata, equidistant from Mundah and Barwa, cavalry reconnaissances being pushed forward to the Batai and

Shinai passes. On the 12th the Second Brigade was at Khar,[1] and the Third at Shamshak in the Watelai Valley, where the camp was fired into during the night.

Sir Bindon Blood had now intended to co-operate with General Elles, and for this purpose he himself moved on the 14th with the Third Brigade to Nawagai, while General Jeffreys seized the Rambat Pass, bivouacking on the Chaharmung stream near Inayat Kila, an Utman Khel village. Here a determined attack was made upon the Second Brigade camp at night by Mamunds and Utman Khels, who were unusually well armed and, creeping along the broken ground, were able to gain positions near the camp from which they maintained a very galling fire for nearly six hours, almost without intermission. Our casualties were seven killed (three British officers) and ten wounded, and the losses among the transport were serious, amounting to nearly a hundred. When daylight appeared the cavalry were sent after the retreating enemy and accounted for many of them.

The idea of joining the Third Brigade at Nawagai had now to be given up in favour of punitive operations in the Mamund country, and co-operation with General Elles was for the present impossible; the First Brigade was therefore ordered to move up to the Panjkora, the Third remaining entrenched at Nawagai. Here, on the night of the 19th and 20th determined attacks were made upon the camp,

[1] Not to be confused with the village of the same name in Lower Swat.

chiefly by the Hadda Mullah's men from the Bedmanai Pass; they were beaten off without much difficulty, but some of them were shot down within ten yards of the entrenchment; we had one man killed and thirty-one wounded, among the latter being General Wodehouse. On the 22nd Sir Bindon Blood proceeded to the Mamund Valley to rejoin General Jeffreys; the Third Brigade on the same date being attached to the force under General Elles for completion of the operations against the Mohmands.

In the meantime the Second Brigade under General Jeffreys had been engaged in further fighting. On the 16th the troops marched up the Watelai Valley in three small columns, directed respectively on Badalai, Badan and Agra, and experienced in the operations which resulted the heaviest loss which British troops have suffered in frontier warfare, in a single day's fighting, since the Ambela campaign. The right column destroyed some villages and then, finding a considerable force of the enemy occupying a strong position from which it seemed impossible to dislodge them without guns, returned to camp. The remaining two columns moved up the valley, the enemy retiring before them; when, however, it became necessary for the troops to halt to await the return of a party which had been detached, the enemy began to press forward in considerable numbers, inflicting some loss upon two companies of the 35th Sikhs, which were falling back upon their supports. The pressure was, however, temporarily relieved by an opportune charge of a squadron of the

11th Bengal Lancers under Captain Cole. The two columns commenced their withdrawal to camp at Inayat Kila about 3 p.m. A flanking party of two companies of the 35th Sikhs had not received the order to retire, but when the party commenced to do so, it withdrew in a direction rather diverging from the general line of retreat. These companies were assailed by the enemy on all sides, and did not extricate themselves, assisted finally by the Guides, until they had suffered over forty casualties. As the whole force continued its retirement darkness came on, accompanied by a heavy thunderstorm, and the General, considering it would be difficult to reach camp that night and anxious about his flanking parties, decided to occupy some villages till morning. The orders failed, however, to reach all the units; some pushed on to camp; but about dusk General Jeffreys found himself with no troops at his immediate disposal, except four guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, a small party of Sappers, and a few men of the Buffs and 35th Sikhs, who had become separated from their companies in the dark. With these the General decided to occupy a hamlet called Bilot, about 3½ miles from camp. Part of this village was burning and half was in possession of the enemy, who had been following up closely, and the party with the General was only able to occupy and entrench one angle of the hamlet. Fighting was kept up at the closest possible quarters, and with heavy losses on both sides, until the arrival, about midnight, of four companies of the 35th Sikhs, with

whose assistance the enemy were easily driven off, the rest of the night passing quietly.

The casualties during this day's fighting amounted to 38 killed and 116 wounded, including three followers.

During the next few days the Second Brigade was busily employed in destroying villages and removing grain-stores—always under fire, while the retirement to camp was invariably closely pressed. On the 23rd the Mamunds professed to be disheartened at their losses and anxious to make terms; but it seems probable that all they wished was to gain breathing time, for the negotiations came to nothing, and operations were accordingly resumed on the 29th September when many towers were demolished. The wounded were sent down to the Panjkora, and the heavy casualties in transport animals were made good.

On the 30th September the brigade attacked the villages of Agra and Gat, and severe fighting ensued, the enemy in great numbers occupying a position of considerable strength. More than once the Mamunds had to be driven from their sangars at the point of the bayonet, and, although the object of the operations was effected and the retirement was satisfactorily carried out, the want of more troops—for the brigade was by now greatly weakened—was much felt; on this day the casualties numbered twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, while throughout the losses in officers had been out of all proportion. Sir Bindon Blood now reinforced the troops in the Mamund

country by bringing up another squadron of the Guides Cavalry, the 10th Field Battery, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, four companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

On the 3rd October the Second Brigade, with two mountain batteries, attacked and destroyed the village of Badalai, experiencing small opposition until the retirement commenced, when the enemy came on with great boldness, and to the number of between two and three thousand.

There was now a very large body of troops at Inayat Kila, and the Mamunds began clearly to recognise the hopelessness of prolonging the resistance. They accordingly opened negotiations through the Khan of Nawagai, their jirgah finally coming in on the 11th October and agreeing to all our terms. The operations against the Mamunds, who had shown fighting qualities of a high order, now came to an end, and the troops were withdrawn from the Watelai Valley. During the period from the 14th September to the 11th October, our casualties totalled 61 killed and 218 wounded.

On his way back to the Malakand, Sir Bindon Blood halted in the Salarzai Valley and easily forced that section of the Tarkanris to submit, while the Babukarra Valley was thoroughly explored. The last of the troops crossed the Panjkora on the 23rd, and four days later the whole force returned to the Swat Valley.

Since the conclusion of the operations just described,

the clans of Dir and Bajaur have given no trouble to the British Government; but the efforts which the ambitions of the local khans cause them to make in order to add to their territories, and the constant intrigues of pretenders and other claimants, combine with the natural pugnacity of the Pathan to cause some occasional anxiety as to the continued security of our communications with Chitral.


Swat Buner and Bajaur
Scale of Miles
BAJAUR
SWAT
BUNER
PESHAWAR

Utman Khel and Mohmand Countries




General Tribal Map
Scale of Miles
AFGHANISTAN
AKOZAI
YUSAFZAI
SWATI
BAJAUR
UTMAN KHEL
BUNERWAL
MOHMAND
MANDANR
SAFZAI
SHINWARI
AFRIDI
ORAKZAI
AFRIDI
ZAIMUKHT
BANGASH
KHATTAK
FRONTIER
PROVINCE
BANNUCHI
WAZIRS
KHEL
DARWESH
MAHSUD
MARWAT
BATANNI
KURRAM
KHASSORS
LOHANI
NORTH WEST
GANDAPUR
SHERANI
MIAN KHEL
MANDO KHEL
PUNJAB


THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
PROVINCE.
Scale of Miles
REFERENCES.
Boundary line of Afghanistan, demarcated
undemarcated
Other undemarcated boundaries
District boundaries
Portion under direct British Administration
Chitral Agency
Frontier Tribes within the political supervision of the Governor General's Agent
Railways
Roads, Main
Minor
Passes
Trigonometrical Stations with heights
Intersected Points
70°
72°
74°
36°
34°
32°
AFGHANISTAN
KAFARISTAN
KASHMIR
PUNJAB
JHELUM
RAWALPINDI
SHAHPUR
CHILAS
DAREL
BALUCHISTAN AGENCY